Cybersecurity
Keep offensive security agents inside their mandate.
Pentesting agents are told to find exploits in systems they don't own, often on models with reduced guardrails. VAIL reads each agent's mandate, rules of engagement, and tools, finds where the agent could step outside them, and probes the live agent to show where it does.
Where offensive agents go wrong
An offensive agent’s job is the work other agents are trained to refuse: probe, exploit, escalate. Many run on models with reduced guardrails so they don’t refuse it. That leaves the written mandate as the main control, and a mandate written in prose has gaps.
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Scope drift
Scanning or attacking hosts outside the engagement, because the scope is written loosely or a target points the agent at infrastructure that isn't in it.
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Instructions planted in the target
A system under test returns text that reads as instructions, in a banner, a file, or an error message, and the agent follows it.
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Actions beyond the mandate
Taking real data out, running destructive commands, or leaving access in place after the engagement, when the mandate only called for showing the exploit works.
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Silent changes underneath
A new model or harness version that follows the rules of engagement less closely, with no change to the agent’s own code.
How VAIL checks an offensive agent
- 01Read the mandate
- VAIL reads the agent’s instructions, rules of engagement, tool schemas, and memory, and maps each rule to the ways the agent could break it: rules that are ambiguous, that conflict, or that are hard to follow mid-engagement.
- 02Probe the live agent
- Each risk becomes a probe: a message to the agent’s endpoint and checks on its reply and tool calls, such as never calling a scanning tool against a host outside scope. A person approves each probe before it runs.
- 03Report findings
- Every finding cites the rule at stake, with its failure rate, trend, and latest failing example.
- 04Keep watching
- Approved probes run hourly, daily, or weekly, so a rule that starts slipping after a model or harness update shows up as a regression.
Securing the AI supply chain
The same attack surfaces apply to every agent and model you run, offensive or not.
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Model provenance
Verify where a model came from, including fine-tunes and distillations, before you adopt it.
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Supply chain integrity
Verify that the model running is the one you approved, and catch swaps, tampering, and unauthorized updates.
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Agent configuration changes
Flag when changes to memory, skills, or tool descriptions redirect an agent, even when no code changed.
Built for
- Teams
- Offensive security firms and red teams running autonomous agents, CISOs, security operations, and threat intelligence.
- Requirements
- An API endpoint for the agent and a written definition: mandate, rules of engagement, and tool schemas.
- Deployment
- No SDK, no trace access, and no customer data read. Managed, in your cloud, or air-gapped.
Research
All publications-
ICML 2026 · AIWILD
Tracking the Behavioral Trajectories of Adapting Agents
Measures how an agent’s behavioral traits shift as its skill files and context change over time.
Read on arXiv → -
ACM CAIS 2026 · Demo
Behavioral Fingerprints for LLM Endpoint Stability and Identity
Detects a swapped or altered model from its outputs alone.
Detects changes in model family, version, inference stack, quantization, and behavioral parameters.
Read on arXiv → -
Joint study · Cisco and VAIL · August 2026
Models don't have passports: AI lineage crosses organizational and geographic borders
Lineage detection from weights and from behavior, each catching cases the other misses.
Weight analysis and behavioral fingerprints each recover documented model lineage (p = 0.00001 and p = 0.00002).
Read the paper (PDF) → -
Joint study · Lucid Computing, Lunal, and VAIL · ICDS 2025
Hardware-Rooted Trust Anchors for Sovereign AI Processing
Hardware trust, location attestation, and behavioral fingerprints combined to verify a model running on untrusted infrastructure.
Quantized versions of the same model score above 0.91 similarity; unrelated models of similar size score 0.63 to 0.84.
Read the paper (PDF) → -
VAIL White Paper · January 2025
Security Assurances for AI in High-Stakes Environments using Verifiable Computation
The AI supply chain threats, from tampered training data to replaced models, and how zero-knowledge proofs and trusted hardware verify a deployed model.
Read the paper (PDF) →
Go further
Request an assessment.
Tell us which model or agent you need verified. We reply within one business day with a scope and a start date.
Or write to contact@projectvail.com